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Anticipatory and Post Hoc Cushioning Strategies: 
Optimism and Defensive Pessimism in 
"Risky" Situations 1 
Julie K. Norem 2 and Nancy Cantor 
University o f  Michigan 
The concept o f  cognitive strategies is proposed as a model for  the process 
by which individuals cushion themselves against threats to self-esteem in 
"risky" situations. Two strategies are discussed. The first is defensive 
pessimism, an anticipatory strategy that involves setting defensively low ex- 
pectations prior to entering a situation, so as to defend against loss o f  self- 
esteem in the event o f failure. The second is an optimistic strategy, where 
expectations are high at the outset, and post hoc restructuring o f  the situa- 
tion is done when the outcome is known. Expectations about performance 
on an anagram task were collected from prescreened optimistics and defen- 
sive pessimists. After completion o f  the task, subjects were given false failure 
or success feedback. A posttest measuring self-reported satisfaction, feel- 
ings o f  control, and performance evaluations was administered. As  predicted, 
subjects selected for  defensive pessimist attitudes expected to perform 
significantly worse than did those selected for  optimistic attitudes, even 
though there was no difference in actual performance. Moreover, optimists 
demonstrated attributional egotism in claiming significantly more control over 
their performance in the success condition than in the failure condition. 
Pessimists did not show this pattern. The data provide evidence o f  post hoc 
cushioning efforts among optimists, whereas defensive pessimists seem to 
be cushioned by their initial structuring o f  the situation. It is argued that 
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these strategies can be understood as motivated attempts to solve the "pro- 
blem" of  a "risky" situation. 
KEY WORDS: strategies; defensive pessimism; optimism. 
Interpretations of  situations are frequently assumed to guide the planning 
and execution of behavior (Kelly, 1955/1963; Goldfried, Padawer, & Robins, 
1984; Mischel, 1973). To understand how people interpret important situa- 
tions, it seems reasonable to consider those situations as presenting problems 
to be solved (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1985). In order to solve the problem of 
a given situation through appropriate and effective action, individuals must 
(1) understand the problem so as to determine what they can expect to en- 
counter, (2) plan a solution to the problem, which includes selection of ap- 
propriate behaviors, (3) expend the effort necessary to implement the 
behaviors selected, and (4) monitor the impact and effectiveness of that 
behavior (D'Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971; McFall, 1982; Spivak, Platt, & Shure, 
1976). 
It is clear, however, that many of the complex situations of interest 
to psychologists present problems that are generally ill-defined, as opposed 
to well-defined (Cantor, 1984; Kihlstrom, 1984). To the extent that this is 
true, there should be considerable variation in the framing or representation 
of the problems in a given situation. It then becomes necessary to determine 
what factors influence how different individuals construct the "problem" in 
a situation differently. The problem-solving cycle involves continual reference 
to the appropriateness or effectiveness of behaviors relative to a particular 
desired outcome or goal. It seems, therefore, that the personal goals or ob- 
jectives of the individual may have considerable impact on the framing of 
the problem, and thus on the entire problem-solving cycle (Higgins, McCann, 
& Fondacaro, 1982). 
This paper will consider how individuals go about solving the problems 
presented by situations that are "risky" (i.e., that can be interpreted as present- 
ing a potential threat to self-esteem), and dealing with the potential success 
or failure of their solutions. Specifically, discussion will center on two par- 
ticular cognitive strategies that people may use to solve the problems presented 
by a situation in which successful performance is desired. Often, in situa- 
tions where success is possible, there is a congruent possibility of failure. 
Starting with this premise, the paper will focus on ways of constructing the 
problem of these "risky" situations so as to cushion the impact of potential 
failure. 
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ANTICIPATORY STRATEGIES 
The construction of a situation involving the possibility of success or 
failure depends to some extent on both the degree to which individuals fear 
potential failure, and the strength of their desire for success. If the goal of 
avoiding failure is as important as, or more important than, the goal of achiev- 
ing success in a given situation, the individual should construct the situation 
accordingly and select a strategy that increases the probability of avoiding 
failure. For example, Jones and Berglas (1978) present a "self-handicapping" 
strategy whereby individuals faced with a threat to self-esteem, like a risky 
achievement situation, withdraw effort in order to avoid the implications 
about competence that may result from failure. Anticipating a threat to self- 
esteem, they restructure the attributional situation so as to minimize that 
threat. By withdrawing effort (or "sabotaging" themselves), self-handicapping 
persons avoid negative ability attributions. Failure is simply attributed to 
lack of effort, which is presumably less "incriminating" than lack of ability, 
because it is an unstable cause that is potentially under the control of the 
individual (Weiner & Kukla, 1970). In the unlikely event of success, where 
the self-handicapper has succeeded despite lack of effort, the implication is 
that he is exceptionally able. 
There are three important points to be noted about the self-handicapping 
strategy. First, the structure of the situation as one with important attribu- 
tional implications is done by the individual before entering the situation. 
Second, Jones and Berglas argue that individuals using the strategy do so 
because they have an excessive fear of the competence implications of failure. 
Third, for the strategy to succeed in protecting self-esteem and competence 
beliefs, the individual must see the attributional implications of the situa- 
tion as more important than the failure or success of the performance itself. 
That is, there is more emphasis on the problem of protecting self-esteem than 
on the goal of achieving success. 
Alternative constructions of the same situation are required when per- 
sonal goals conflict-  i.e., when there is a fear of failure and a strong desire 
for success. In this situation, a strategy called "defensive pessimism" may 
be used. By this is meant a discounting of past successes, and the lowering 
of expectations prior to entering a situation, in order to prepare or defend 
against excessive loss of self-esteem should failure occur. 
This strategy should be used by individuals faced with a performance 
situation in which failure is threatening to self-esteem or self-image and suc- 
cess is highly desirable and important to the individual. Thus, unlike the self- 
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handicapper, for the individual utilizing this strategy, the attributional im- 
plications are important, but they do not override the significance of the per- 
formance itself. The defensive pessimist, therefore, does not feel he can afford 
to jeopardize his chances of success by withdrawing effort. However, he is 
still faced with conflict between his wish to avoid failure, which tempts him 
away from the situation, and his desire for success, which pushes him into 
the situation. The problem, as constructed by the defensive pessimist, is to 
overcome the immobilization that results from conflicting goals (Atkinson 
& Litwin, 1960). His solution is to prepare himself for failure by defensively 
setting low expectations in advance. By "playing through" potential bad out- 
comes before they occur, the defensive pessimist gains some degree of con- 
trol over his anxiety. It's as if he braces himself against the impact of failure 
by dwelling on the possibility. 3 
Though this strategy should prepare one for failure, we do not expect 
the defensive pessimist to be pleased with failure. With the situation struc- 
tured as described, the impact of failure on self-esteem should be cushioned 
to the extent that the defensive pessimist should not need to engage in pro- 
tective restructuring after the fact. His prior structuring of the situation, not 
the eventual outcome, should determine feelings of control. Thus, we do not 
expect defensive pessimists to deny control over, or responsibility for, failure, 
or to claim significantly more control over success than over failure. 
A "POST HOC" STRATEGY 
In contrast to the defensive structuring of a situation prior to entering, 
it is also possible to cushion oneself against failure after that failure has oc- 
curred. Reflecting this alternative construction of the same situation, we 
hypothesize a particular optimistic strategy that builds on research into "il- 
lusory glow" cognitive biases found among "normal" (i.e., nondepressed) col- 
lege student subjects (see Greenwald, 1980, for a review). These biases can 
be seen as part of a general strategy whereby the goal of maintaining or enhanc- 
ing self-esteem is translated into the behavior found in the literature on self- 
serving biases. We hypothesize that the optimist does not see advance pro- 
tection against failure as the prirnary problem presented by achievement situa- 
tions. The main problem for the optimist is trying to achieve success from 
3We assume that  the same "objective" situation, e.g., a final exam, may be interpreted as one 
appropriate for self-handicapping o r  defensive pessimism, depending on the individual. Though 
we currently have no evidence on this matter ,  it seems reasonable to suspect that  the intensity 
o f  fear of  failure may be one variable that determines selection of  the self-handicapping strategy 
over the defensive pessimist strategy in a given situation. 
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the outset; he deals with failure when it happens. The optimist, for whatever 
reason, is not particularly fearful of failure and is thus able to "trust" his 
past base rate when setting expectations. He is, however, motivated to 
"cushion" himself if and when failure does occur. Not having prepared himself 
in advance, he relies on post hoc attributions to protect his self-esteem. If 
he fails, he is prepared to maintain his self-esteem by denying that he had 
control over the situation. These attributions are not limited by his prior struc- 
turing of the situation, as is the case for defensive pessimists. 
Assuming these descriptions of the strategies, we make two major 
predictions about the differences between the behavior of the "normal" op- 
timists and that of "normal" persons using the defensive pessimist strategy 
in risky achievement situations: 
First, we expect pessimists to have lower expectations than optimists 
about an upcoming performance, even given similar past base rates. This 
lowering of expectations is the initial defensive maneuver. 
Second, pessimists faced with failure in a given situation should be 
cushioned by the strategy; i.e., they should be able to acknowledge control 
over their performance. Pessimists have presumably cushioned themselves 
prior to entering a situation by emphasizing the probability of failure. In 
contrast, the optimists can be expected to use "illusory glow" cognitive biases, 
such as denial of control over failure, after the fact (Alloy & Abramson, 
1979). This strategy allows optimists to alter the attributional implications 
of failure and thus "cushion" the impact of negative outcomes. Clearly, the 
argument is not that either optimists or pessimists are happy with failure. 
Rather, we predict that, for optimists, perception of control will be significant- 
ly related to satisfaction and performance evaluation and thus should vary 
as a function of outcome. In contrast, for the pessimists, feeling of control 
should not be related to satisfaction and performance evaluation since they 




In order to begin to test these hypotheses, we prescreened subjects for 
optimistic and defensively pessimistic attitudes. The prescreening resulted in 
subjects chosen for two groups: those thought to use optimistic strategies, 
and those thought to use defensively pessimistic strategies in achievement 
situations. These subjects were asked to predict their performance on an 
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anagram test, and then to take the test. Half the subjects within each strategy 
grouping were given false feedback indicating failure; half were given false 
feedback indicating success. A posttest assessing self-evaluation of perfor- 
mance, satisfaction, and attributions about the situation was administered 
after two anagram blocks. Subjects were then debriefed about the false feed- 
back, and a third set of predictions was gathered to assess feedback 
perseverance. 
Prescreening and Subjects Selection 
A total of 1,027 subjects from an introductory psychology subject pool 
were administered a prescreening questionnaire designed to identify self- 
reported use of optimistic or defensively pessimistic strategies in an academic 
domain. Subjects indicated to what degree a series of eight statements describ- 
ing characteristics of either optimism or defensive pessmism was characteristic 
of their thoughts and behavior in academic situations (see Table I). An 
"optimism-pessimism" score was then computed for each subject by subtract- 
ing the sum of their endorsement of four pessimistic items (questions 1, 4, 
6, and 8) from the sum of their endorsements of four optimistic items (ques- 
tions, 2, 5, 7, and 9). Analyses of the total prescreened sample showed that 
items 1, 2, 3, and 6 were most predictive of the total optimism-pessimism 
scores (item-by-item correlations with total score, Fs > .57). 
Subjects also indicated which of a series of general strategy profiles best 
described them. There were four profiles, which consisted of general descrip- 
tions of strategies or approaches. The profiles described an optimistic outlook, 
where an individual acknowledges generally positive past experiences and ex- 
pects positive outcomes in the future; a defensive pessimistic outlook, where 
positive past experience is recognized, but expectations for future outcomes 
Table I. Opt imism-Pessimism Prescreening Questionnaire 
Rate each of  the following items using the scale below to indicate how true it is of  you.  
-- 1 ----2----3 ----4----5 ----6----7 ---- 8 ----9---- 10---- 11 -- 
Not at all Very true 
true of  me of  me 
1. I go into academic situations expecting the worst, even though I know I will probably do OK. 
2. I generally go into academic situations with positive expectations about  how I will do. 
3. I've generally done pretty well in academic situations in the past.  
4. I often think about  what it will be like if I do very poorly in an  academic situation. 
5. I often think about  what it will be like if I do very  well in an  academic situation. 
6. I often think about  what I would do if I did very poorly in an  academic situation. 
7. I often try to figure out  how likely it is that  I will do very well in an  academic situation. 
8. When  I do well in academic situations, I often feel relieved. 
9. When  I do well in academic situations, I feel really happy.  
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are low; a "regular" pessimistic outlook, where past experience is considered 
negative and more negative outcomes are expected; and an "unjustified" op- 
timistic outlook, where past experience is bad, but expectations for the future 
are good. The "regular" pessimistic outlook was seen as similar to that of 
a depressive, and was included specifically to distinguish between optimists 
and defensive pessimists on the one hand and depressives on the other. In 
addition, we included only those subjects who strongly endorsed question 
3 in Table I; "I've generally done pretty well in academic situations in the 
past," thus choosing subjects who specifically acknowledged a high past base 
rate. 
The average scores on each item of the prescreening, for the entire 
sample and for the selected groups of  optimists and pessimists, are included 
in Table II. We selected individuals from the "pessimistic" and "optimistic" 
tails of the distribution of pessimists scores, who also gave relatively strong 
endorsements of the correpsonding profiles, and who strongly endorsed ques- 
tion 3. Subjects selected as pessimists had an average rank of 1,009 (out of 
1,027) for their optimism-pessimism scores (where a lower score means more 
pessimism), and the optimists selected had an average rank of 22. Moreover, 
to have some control for past experience and ability, we selected only sub- 
jects with grade point average of 3.0 or higher. There was no significant dif- 
ference in GPA for optimists and pessimists (X = 3.34, and X = 3.23, 
respectively, F(1, 63) = 1.49, n.s.). 
It should be noted that the items included in the prescreening are 
specifically concerned with academic situations. This is because defensive 
pessimism and optimism as referred to here are not considered to be broad 
cognitive traits. They are described as strategies precisely because it is believed 
that they can be used selectively (i.e., strategically) in different situations, 
depending on context-specific goals. Indeed, there is preliminary evidence 
Table II. Ratings f rom Prescreening Questions 
Entire Sample Optimists Pessimists 
(N = 1,027) (N = 35) (N = 34) 
Question No. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 4.79 2.68 2.09 1.27 8.51 2.11 
2 7.34 2.31 9.95 .90 3.65 1.46 
3 8.64 1.86 9.95 .84 9.12 1.55 
4 6.14 2.99 2.74 1.21 8.98 2.40 
5 7.82 2.59 9.97 1.06 5.40 3.12 
6 5.72 2.86 2.58 1.18 8.47 2.30 
7 7.57 2.52 0.97 1.91 6.23 3.02 
8 8.90 2.23 6.39 2.74 9.98 1.12 
9 9.83 1.46 10.16 1.05 8.98 2.36 
Total opt imism- 
pessimism score 7.02 9.42 25.35 3.45 - 11.67 5.29 
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that indicates that subjects using defensive pessimism in social contexts do 
not necessarily use it in academic domains. An analogous prescreening for 
optimism and defensive pessimism in social situations was done on the same 
sample discussed here, in order to select subjects for a complementary 
study. A moderate correlation was found between self-reported use of  a par- 
ticular strategy in one domain and the other (r = .38), but the overlap between 
the situations was far from complete. 
Experimental Design 
Sixty-nine prescreened subjec ts -35  optimists and 34 pessimists-par-  
ticipated in the experiment. Subjects within the pessimistic and optimistic 
strategy groupings were randomlyassigned to either a "success" or "failure" 
feedback condition. The 2(strategy) x 2(feedback condition) design resulted 
in four cells: failure pessimists, failure optimists, success pessimists, and suc- 
cess optimists. 
The study was run with subjects, in groups of  four or five, who were 
told that the study was concerned with "what kind of  abilities are necessary 
for different tasks." It was expected that this explanation, in conjunction 
with the description of  the task, would serve as an achievement induction 
that would prime performance goals connected with academic situations, and 
the risks congruent with attempts to achieve those goals (Weiner, 1965). 
The anagram task was described, and subjects were asked to predict 
how well they thought they would perform on the task. The study was set 
up so that subjects gave initial predictions about their expected performance 
(Time 1), took the timed anagram test, and were given false feedback. After 
a distraction task, new predictions were collected and a second test was given 
(Time 2). Subjects were then asked to complete a posttest questionnaire, after 
which they were debriefed about the false feedback. A third round of  predic- 
tions was then collected to assess feedback perseverance (Time 3). 
After the first set of  predictions was gathered, subjects were given 2 
minutes to solve as many anagrams as they could on each trial. After 2 
minutes, subjects turned in their tests, which were ostensibly scored by the 
experimenter. Each subject was then handed a bogus feedback sheet, with 
false norms and the subject's (false) score. Subjects were unable to see one 
another's scores. In the success condition the subject's scores were an average 
of  10 percentage points higher than the "norms," and in the failure condi- 
tion the scores were an average of  10 percentage points lower than the 
"norms." The feedback given after the second anagram performance was the 
same as that given after the first performance. 
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Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures included the predictions gathered at Time 1 
(before feedback), Time 2 (after feedback), and Time 3 (after debriefing). 
For these predictions, subjects were asked to rate how well they thought they 
would do in comparison to various peer reference groups on a scale from 
1 (very poorly) to 11 (very well). The reference groups included the general 
population, high school graduates, average college students, average Univer- 
sity of Michigan students, and students with the same GPA. 
The posttest questionnaire included self-ratings of the first and second 
trials anagram performances, as well as an overall performance rating. Per- 
formance evaluation ratings were on a scale from 1 (very poorly) to 11 (very 
well). Subjects also rated their satisfaction with and feelings of control over 
each performance. The ratings were made on a scale from 1 (unsatisfied or 
no control), to 7 (satisfied or total control). 
RESULTS 
We expected to find that, throughout the experiment, the pessimists' 
predictions would be lower than the optimists' in a given condition. There 
should also be evidence of post hoc cushioning efforts among the optimists, 
since they deny control over failure and accept responsibility for success. We 
did not expect to see this pattern in the pessimists, who have presumably 
cushioned themselves against failure before entering the situation by "tak- 
ing control," and thus should not alter their perceptions of control after the 
outcome is known. 
Since, across all subjects, prediction of performance relative to any par- 
ticular reference group correlated highly with prediction relative to all the 
other reference groups (average r = .73), the predictions were averaged across 
reference groups for each subject. Thus, a prediction score was created for 
each subject for Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3 (see Table III). Figure 1 shows 
the mean prediction scores at all three points. A three-way (strategy × con- 
dition x time) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the time factor, per- 
formed on these prediction scores shows a significant difference in 
expectations between optimists and pessimists that remains throughout the 
experiment (F(1, 65) = 5.07, p = .03). This analysis also reveals a condition 
(success or failure) main effect (F(1, 65) = 4.40, p = .04). There was also 
a condition x time interaction effect, indicating significant change in predic- 
tions across Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3, depending on condition assign- 
ment (F(2, 130) = 8.32, p = .000). 
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Fig. 1. Prediction scores at Time 1, Time 2, and Time 3: success optimists, failure optimists, 
success pessimists, and failure pessimists. 
Given these results from the overall ANOVA, the mean prediction scores 
at Time 1 for optomists and pessimists were compared (see Table III). Op- 
tomists predicted that they would do significantly better than pessimists 
predicted they would do (F(1, 68) = 6.15, p = .02). This initial difference 
between strategy groups is in the predicted direction and provides validation 
of the prescreening procedure. The pessimists' lower expectations for their 
performance exist even though both groups have had similar (high) past rates 
of success in the academic domain. Moreover, means for the actual scores 
of all four cells on both the Time 1 and Time 2 tests (see Table III) show 
Table III. Prediction Scores, Actual Scores, and GPAs 
Optimists Pessimists 
Success Failure Success Failure 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Prediction 
s c o r e s  
Time 1 7.40 1.16 7.62 1.66 6.86 1.40 6.49 1.38 
Time 2 6.14 1.12 5.24 1.65 5.80 1.80 4.60 1.14 
Time 3 7.14 1.17 6.88 1.86 6.94 1.14 5.96 1.53 
Actual scores 
Time 1 39.39 8.99 40.82 17.58 40.65 16.34 36.77 13.18 
Time 2 36.06 15.06 37.00 16.84 37.35 14.10 30.41 12.54 
N = 18 N = 17 N = 17 N =17 
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no significant difference in performance (all Fs < 1). This gives additional 
support to our claim that differences in ability do not account for the dif- 
ference in expectations between optimists and pessimists. 
Information about the condition manipulation is provided by a three- 
way ANOVA of  prediction scores at Time 1 and Time 2. This analysis shows 
a strategy main effect (F(1, 65) -- 4.87, p = .03), a condition main effect 
(F(1, 65) = 3.53, p = .06), and a time main effect (F(1, 65) = 113.61, p 
= .000). Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 1, all the subjects lowered 
their predictions at Time 2, relative to Time 1. Apparently all the subjects 
found the test more difficult or involved than they had anticipated, and 
lowered their predictions accordingly. Evidence that the feedback manipula- 
tion was effective is apparent in the time x condition interaction effect (F(1, 
65) = 18.40, p = .000). This effect is accounted for by significant differences 
between success subjects' expectations and failure subjects' expectations at 
Time 2 (after receiving the first feedback) (F(1, 68) = 12.20, p = .000), a 
difference that does not exist at Time 1 (F < 1). 
Finally, prediction scores in both conditions changed somewhat after 
debriefing, as evidenced by Figure 1. A three-way repeated-measures ANOVA 
of  the Time 2 and Time 3 prediction scores reveals main effects for strategy 
(F(1, 65) = 3.84, p = .05), condition (F(1, 65) = 9.02, p = .004), and time 
(Time 2 to Time 3, (F(1, 65) = 113.61, p = .000). The time × condition 
interaction term is not significant (F < 1). Thus, failure subjects' scores at 
Time 3 are still significantly less than success subjects' scores at Time 3 (F(1, 
68) = 4.54, p = .04). 
Our second hypothesis was that pessimists would not alter their con- 
struction of  the situation after the fact as a function of  feedback. In con- 
trast, we expected optimists to "revise" their perceptions of  the situation 
according to the feedback they received, and thus to feel less control in the 
failure condition than in the success condition. Optimists should be using 
their attributions of  control to explain their lack of  satisfaction and low per- 
formance in the failure condition in ways that do not implicate competence, 
(i.e., so self-esteem is not threatened). As part of  the greater satisfaction felt 
in the success condition, the optimists should be willing to accept more respon- 
sibility for their performances. In contrast, the pessimists have already con- 
structed the situation in a self-protective light prior to entering, and thus 
should not "rework" it in order to control attributions. 
In fact, examination of  the correlations among the posttest dependent 
measures shows a significant relationship between satisfaction and control, 
and between perceived performance and control among the optimists (r = 
.68, and r = .52, respectively, for the first trial; r = .69 and r = .39 for 
the 2nd trial). In contrast, there is no relationship between feelings of  con- 
trol and either satisfaction or perceived performance for the pessimists (r 
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Table IV. Means for Satisfaction, Control, and Performance 
Evaluations for First and Second Anagram Performance a 
Optimists Pessimists 
Posttest ratings Success Failure Success Failure 
Satisfaction, 
1st trial 4.66 3.17 4.70 2.82 
2nd trial 4.72 3.17 4.47 2.82 
Control 
1st trial 5.00 3.05 4.88 4.00 
2nd trial 4.83 3.41 4.64 4.18 
Performace 
1st trial 6.94 5.23 6.52 4.00 
2nd trial 6.72 4.94 6.29 4.06 
aRatings were made after false feedback was given, before 
debriefing. 
= .11 for control and satisfaction; r = .08 for control and performance 
for the 1st trial; r = .18 and r = .03 for the 2nd trial). 
Thus, we find evidence of  post hoe cushioning by optimists that is not 
found for pessimists. Success optimists report feeling significantly more in 
control than failure optimists for both the first and second anagram trials 
(F(1, 34) = 14.50, p = .0006; F(1, 34) = 8.49, p = .006). There is no signifi- 
cant difference, however, between pessimists' reports of control across suc- 
cess and failure feedback (F < 1, for both trials). Table IV shows the mean 
satisfaction, control, and performance ratings in all four cells, for both 
anagram performances. Optimists are showing attributional egotism by tak- 
ing responsibility for success and denying blame for failure. Pessimists are 
not showing this trend. Presumably this indicates that pessimists are not 
cushioning failure by denying that they had control but, as a function of 
their anticipatory structuring of  the situation, are accepting responsibility 
for both success and failure. 
Further supporting our contention that failure pessimists are cushion- 
ed without using the post hoc optimistic strategy, the data reveal no signifi- 
cant differences in satisfaction between optimists and pessimists in the failure 
condition, for either their first or their second anagram performance (Fs < 
1, n.s.). Thus, failure pessimists are no less satisfied than failure optimists 
(or no more dissatisfied), even though they are not doing post hoc cushioning. 
Finally, both optimists and pessimists are accepting the success feed- 
back, as indicated by their reported feelings of satisfaction. That is, both 
optimists and pessimists reported feeling significantly more satisfied in the 
success condition than in the failure condition (F(1, 65) = 24.05, p < .001, 
1st trial; F(1, 65) = 25.32, p < .001, 2nd trial). Moreover, the difference 
in satisfaction between successful pessimists and successful optimists was not 
significant (Fs < 1). This provides evidence that differentiates between 
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depressives and pessimists. The pessimists are not simply prone to lower 
evaluations of their performance, or to a generally "gloomy" outlook com- 
pared to the rosy "glow" of the success optimists. 
DISCUSSION 
The present study provides support for the hypothesized strategy of 
defensive pessimism. The results clearly show that there are differences in 
level of expectation that we were able to predict by asking people well in 
advance of a task how they typically approach risky academic situations. 
This is the case even though both groups reported having done well in the 
past, and even though both groups performed at the same ability level on 
the task. 
The predicted differences in cushioning efforts, evidenced by post hoc 
cognitive work, were also found. The optimists reported feeling significant- 
ly less in control in the failure condition than in the success condition, con- 
forming to the "typical" attributional egotism pattern. Pessimists, however, 
did not demonstrate attributional egotism yet were just as satisfied (or 
dissatisfied) as the optimists. It therefore seems that the pessimists' initial 
lowered expectations are serving to cushion the impact of the subsequent 
failure feedback. The initially pessimistic structure does not, however, in- 
terfere with the enjoyment of success. The pessimists are just as satisfied with 
success feedback as the optimists. This is in contrast to what one would ex- 
pect of depressives, who would not tend to feel satisfied with success feed- 
back (Kuiper, 1978). 
There is considerable debate among workers in social cognition about 
whether cognitive "biases" such as those included in the "illusory glow" are 
properly considered as motivational or informational (see Greenwald, 1982; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980). We began by contending that the strategies of defen- 
sive pessimism and "illusory glow" optimism could both be understood as 
motivated by the desire to maintain self-esteem and competence beliefs. 
Although this contention is not explicitly tested by this experiment, our results 
do strengthen the argument that these strategies are motivated and not simply 
information-processing biases. That is, we found clear differences in strategies 
between two groups with similar (high) performance histories, as indicated 
by their GPAs. Moreover, from the prescreening we chose only those sub- 
jects who acknowledged their past successes, thus reducing any "selective 
memory" bias. In addition, there was no difference in actual performance 
between the pessimists and optimists in either the success or failure condi- 
tion. It is therefore difficult to ascertain a potential basis for differences in 
expectations using an argument based purely on information processing. One 
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cannot assume that defensive pessimists simply have an overall tendency to 
see the "darker side" of things because of bad past experience. Furthermore, 
unlike depressives, pessimists are not reporting overall lower performance 
and satisfaction, especially in the success condition-their lack of "illusory 
glow" is not equivalent to the murky perceptions of depressives. However, 
our assumption is that the defensive pessimists are more fearful of failure 
in this situation than are the optimists; they are thus motivated to construct 
the "problem" presented by the situation in a different way. In fact, data 
gathered using a thought-listing procedure, where prescreened subjects im- 
agined their thoughts and feelings the night before an exam, indicate that 
prescreened pessimists wrote significantly more sentences with a negative tone, 
more often mentioned feeling worried, anxious, or nervous, and more fre- 
quently anticipated a "worst case" outcome than did prescreened optimists 
(Showers & Cantor, 1984). 
From our "problem-solving" perspective, emphasizing different goals 
that underlie strategic behavior, we can parsimoniously account for the 
observed differences. Subjects using the defensive pessimist strategy were fac- 
ed with the conflicting goals of wanting to avoid the risk of failure and wan- 
ting to achieve success. Using the concept of a strategy, it is possible to 
understand how setting low expectations can function defensively, and free 
the individual to construe the situation is a more motivating light. 
Much of the information bias argument against motivational explana- 
tions is based on the assumption that the information gathered and process- 
ed in a situation is biased systematically by the expectations of the perceiver 
(Tetlock & Levi, 1982). Our argument is that it is precisely in setting expec- 
tations before entering a situation that motivational influences can be observ- 
ed in the case of defensive pessimism. The defensive pessimist strategy seems 
to be acting as a form of "natural" cognitive therapy for those using it. Fac- 
ed with a threatening situation, the individual needs to be able to overcome 
the immobilization caused by a fear of failure that conflicts with the desire 
to achieve success. In order to act effectively, the individual structures the 
situation by "playing through" bad outcomes and thus controlling anxiety 
(Kuhl, 1984). This then should serve to reduce the conflict and motivate the 
individual to expend the effort necessary for success. The individual, in this 
situation, may be acting much as a cognitive therapist might with a patient 
in a similar situation. That is, the defensive pessimism systematically restruc- 
tures the situation in order to better utilize the problem-solving skills he has 
available; he is thus able to overcome debilitating anxiety and focus on the 
task (Goldfried, 1979; Meichenbaum, 1977). 
Continued investigation of the use of cognitive strategies such as defen- 
sive pessimism could have potential therapeutic applications, as the effec- 
tiveness of different strategies used over time or in different situations 
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becomes clear (Kihlstrom & Nasby, 1981; Turk & Salovey, 1985). It may be, 
for example, that the "defensive" maneuver of setting low expectations ceases 
to work after a long series of good outcomes. After repeated success, an in- 
dividual may not be able to get himself to believe in the exaggerated possibility 
of failure, at which point the fear of failure can no longer be converted into 
positive motivation. Alternatively, after a string of failures, the possibility 
of "taking control" may diminish: the low expectations that were previously 
defensive become merely realistic and thus do not cushion against subsequent 
failure. At this point, the defensive pessimist might begin to respond to risky 
situations in ways reminiscent of depression. The individual might become 
rigidly pessimistic in a given domain, to the extent that he is unable to over- 
come immobilization because he is convinced that it is impossible to "take 
control." The strategy might also become so habitual that it extends into all 
the relevant domains of an individual's life, at which time the sheer weight 
of all that negativism might prove overwhelming. Continued study of the 
conditions under which "normals" stop using these strategies flexibly may 
provide insight into the development of the negative thinking characteristic 
of depressives. For it is at that point that a motivating strategy may turn 
into a debilitating cognitive "trait." 
REFERENCES 
Alloy, L. B., & Abramson, L. Y. (1979). Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed 
students: Sadder but wiser? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 108, 441-485. 
Atkinson, J. W., & Litwin, G. H. (1960). Achievement motive and test anxiety conceived as 
motive to approach success and motive to avoid failure. Journal ofA bnormal and Social 
Psychology, 60, 52-63. 
Cantor, N. (1984). Social intelligence and life tasks. Invited paper presented at the 56th Annual 
Meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Chicago. 
Cantor, N., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1985). Social intelligence: The cognitive basis of personality. 
In P. Shaver (Ed.), Review of personality and socialpsychology. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
D'Zurilla, T. J., & Goldfried, M. R. (1971). Problem solving and behavior modification. Jour- 
nal of Abnormal Psychology, 78, 107-128. 
Goldfried, M. R. (1979). Anxiety reduction through cognitive-behavioral intervention. In P. 
C. Kendall & S. D. Hollon (Eds.), Cognitive-behavioral interventions: Theory, research, 
and practice. New York: Academic Press. 
Goldfried, M. R., Padawer, W., & Robbins, C. (1984). Social anxiety and the semantic struc- 
ture of heterosocial interactions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 93, 87-97. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. 
American Psychologist, 35, 603-618. 
Greenwald, A. G. (1982). Ego-task analysis: An integration of research on ego-involvement 
and self-awareness. In A. Hastorf & A. Isen (Eds.), Cognitive socialpsychology. New 
York: Elsevier. 
Higgins, E. T., McCann, C. O., & Fondacaro, R. (1982). The "communication game": Goal- 
directed encoding and cognitive consequences. Social Cognition, 1, 21-37. 
362 Norem and Cantor 
Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attribution about the self through self-handicapping 
strategies: The appeal of alcohol and the role of under-achievement. Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin, 4, 200-206. 
Kelly, G. A. (1963). The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton. (Original work 
published 1955.). 
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1984). Personality as social intelligence: Understanding structures and social 
interactions. Invited paper presented at the 56th Annual Meeting of the Midwestern 
Psychological Association, Chicago. 
Kihlstrom, J. F., & Nasby, W. (1981). Cognitive tasks in clinical assessment: An exercise in 
applied psychology. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimentalsocialpsychology 
(Vol. 17). New York: Academic Press. 
Kuhl, J. (1984). Volitional aspects of achievement motivation and learned helplessness: Toward 
a comprehensive theory of action control. In B. Mahrer (Ed.), Progress in experimental 
personality research (Vol. 13). New York: Academic Press. 
Kuiper, N. A. (1978). Depression and causal attribution for success and failure. Journal of Per- 
sonality and Social Psychology, 36, 236-246. 
McFall, R. M. (1982). A review and reformulation of the concept of social skills. Behavioral 
Assessment, 4, 1-33. 
Meichenbanm, D. (1977). Cognitive behavior modification: An integrated approach. New York: 
Plenum Press. 
Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. 
Psychological Review, 80, 252-283. 
Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judg- 
ment. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Showers, C., & Cantor, N. (1984). Optimism and defensive pessimism: Cognitive strategies for 
risky situations. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan. 
Spivak, G., Platt, J. J., & Shure, M. B. (1976). Theproblem solving approach to adjustment. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Tetiock, P. E., & Levi, A. (1982). Attribution basis: On the inconclusiveness of the cognition- 
motivation debate. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 18, 68-88. 
Turk, D. C., & Salovery, P. (1985). Cognitive structures, cognitive processes, and cognitive- 
behavior modification: I. Client issues. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 9, 1-17. 
Weiner, B. (1965). The effects of unsatisfied achievement motivation on persistence and subse- 
quent performance. Journal of Personality, 33, 428-442. 
Weiner, B., & Kukla, A. (1970). An attributional analysis of achievement motivation. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, 1-20. 
